Football risk management and the downfield pitch

In his book Coaching Run-And-Shoot Football, coach Al Black offers the shovel pass as one of the constraint plays the run-and-shoot offense uses to punish defenses playing for the pass, along with the draw and speed option. 

Run and shoot shovel pass away from trips

At the end of his description of the quarterback's responsibilities in the shovel play, coach Black throws in this tidbit: "After the pitch he should continue downfield to be in position to receive a pitchout from the receiver he tossed the ball to."

Very interesting.  In any option play, the quarterback occupies a defender who would otherwise have to be blocked or faked, reducing the minimum number of unoccupied defenders to one (the counterpart of the ballcarrier) from two (the counterparts of the ballcarrier and the QB). But if the ballcarrier (here, the slot receiver) can also occupy a defender with an option, then the number of free defenders is reduced to zero. Put another way, a shovel pass give-and-go creates a triple option (keep, pitch, or pitch and pitch back) with only two runners, meaning two defenders can be left unblocked, the nine remaining defenders can be blocked or otherwise occupied by nine offensive players, and nobody will be left to tackle the ball.  Touchdown, right?  And furthermore, revolutionary offensive concept, right?

Endgame Fail Costs Tennessee vs. Georgia

In football as in chess, endgame tactics are distinct from the opening and the midgame.  In particular, there are times when it is better to possess the ball while tied (or even trailing) in the score than to be defending with the lead.  The Tennessee Volunteers' failure to manage this situation very likely cost them the game yesterday, though Georgia did their best to bail them out with some tactical mistakes of their own.

Having already converted two fourth downs on an epic drive that began on their own 20, Tennessee had a first and goal at the Georgia 7 yard line with 2:41 remaining in the game and the score tied, 24-24.  The appropriate tactic here is to to kneel the ball three times and kick the field goal, costing Georgia it's final timeout and leaving perhaps 30 seconds remaining at the kickoff.  For Georgia, the appropriate tactic is to allow Tennessee to score the touchdown. Although they apparently didn't realize this on first down, on second down their defenders looked surprisingly bewildered by a simple off-tackle run, and Rajion Neal took it in for the score with 1:54 remaining.

NCAA football and NFL football are not exactly the same, and there are important differences in end-game timing, most importantly the clock stoppage for first downs in college.  But the two games are still pretty analogous, so the Advanced NFL Stats win probability calculator can give us a rough idea of the relative value of the two endgame states Tennessee had to choose from.  Georgia got the ball back on their own 25 with 1:54 remaining down seven points, a situation which has historically led to an NFL victory 11% of the time.  If they had started with 30 seconds remaining down three points, they would have been in a situation which has resulted in NFL victory only 6% of the time.  Furthermore, the calculator does not take timeouts into account, and Georgia preserved a crucial final timeout by allowing the Tennessee touchdown.  The timing rules in the NCAA certainly give a college team a better chance of scoring a field goal with 30 seconds and no timeouts than an NFL team would have, but the same rules also help a team trying to score a touchdown with two minutes and a timeout to work with.  The relative difference between the two situations is arguably comparable in both leagues.

Advanced metrics aside, simple reasoning also indicates that being down three with 30 seconds allows much less margin for error than being down seven with two minutes to go.  Including the field goal attempt, 30 seconds might allow time for five or six offensive plays to move approximately 40 yards and attempt a 50 yard field goal, all of which only forces overtime.  A single incomplete pass or completion in bounds drastically reduces the offense's chances, and a sack or tackle short of the first down after the first play might end the game outright.  Finally, an NCAA defense can commit pass interference on any deep pass, knowing it only gives up 15 yards.

As it turned out, of course, Georgia drove down to score the tying touchdown with five seconds left, then won the game on a field goal in the first overtime period.  On the way, however, they made some strange endgame decisions of their own.  With 58 seconds remaining, Georgia QB Aaron Murray completed a 32 yard pass to Brendan Douglas, who chose to gain an extra five yards or so rather than go out of bounds and stop the clock.  Just over 30 seconds were left by the time the Bulldogs ran their next play, an inexplicable three yard checkdown completion that cost them their final timeout.

Tennessee helped the Bulldogs' final drive with two penalties, but the penalty they didn't commit may have cost them their best remaining chance to win.  Murray's scoring pass to Rantavious Wooten with five seconds left was well defended, but in this situation, Tennessee's defensive backs should have treated this like a two point conversion attempt, committing any penalty necessary to prevent the catch, since the maximum cost would be a retry from half the distance to the goal, a one-yard penalty in this case.  In fact, the final play, and arguably the two plays prior beginning at the two yard line with 16 seconds remaining, would have been the ideal situation for Buddy Ryan's "Polish goalline" tactic.  Tennessee could have put their entire 122 man roster on the field for the final three plays, ensuring Georgia would have only one real attempt at the tying score with no time remaining.  Georgia would accept the penalty of too many men on the field and move the ball half the distance to the goal after each play, but only after taking precious seconds attempting to score against a 10 to 1 numerical disadvantage.  Had they used this tactic, Tennessee could well have been penalized for a "Palpably Unfair Act," which gives the officials wide latitude to penalize the defense, prevent the clock from running, or even award a touchdown or a forfeit victory, though it's hard to predict what the officials might have chosen to do so late in a close conference game.